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Abstract
Many developing countries display remarkably high degrees of urban concentration, incommensurate with their levels of urbanization. The cost of excessively
high levels of urban concentration can be very high in terms of overpopulation, congestion, and productivity growth. One strand in the theoretical literature suggests
that such high levels of concentration may be the result of restrictive trade policies
that trigger forces of agglomeration. Another strand in the literature, however,
points out that trade liberalization itself may exacerbate urban concentration by
favoring the further growth of those large urban centers that have better access to
international markets. The empirical basis for judging this question has so far been
weak: in the existing literature, trade policies are poorly measured (or not measured as when trade volumes are used spuriously). Here, we use new disaggregated
tari measures to empirically test the hypothesis. We also employ a treatmentand-control analysis of pre- versus post-liberalization performance of the cities in
liberalizing and non-liberalizing countries. We nd evidence that, controlling for,
among others, largest cities that have ports and, thus, have better access to external markets, liberalizing trade does lead to a reduction in urban concentration.
Finally, by using a cross-country level of analysis we provide some external validity
to the more careful empirical studies that rely on single country data.

Address: Department of Economics, Florida International University, FL 33199, USA, telephone:
305-348-3285, e-mail: karayalc@u.edu.
†
Address: Department of Economics, Florida International University, FL 33199, USA, telephone:
305-348-2316, e-mail: hakan.yilmazkuday@u.edu.
∗

1

Introduction

How does trade liberalization aect urban concentration? This is an important question
because many developing countries display a remarkable degree of urban concentration
and protectionist trade policy has been suggested as one possible cause, resulting in one
or two cities overshadowing all other urban areas in a given country. Figures 1a and 1b
oer some suggestive examples using two measures of urban concentration, namely percentage of urban population in the largest city and Herndahl index of city populations,
for some developing (and developed) economies in 1985. The concentrations observed
are by no means recent phenomena. Around 1930, when developing market economies
had an average level of urbanization of around twelve percent, sixteen percent of their
urban population lived in fourteen large cities that had populations of more than half a
million. Similar levels of urban concentration in the developed world had been attained
in 1880, when its average level of urbanization stood much higher at twenty three percent. The number of the large cities in the developing world as well as their share of
the total urban population increased radically between 1930 and 1980, by which date
they had 43% of the urban population, a number which paralleled that of the developed countries. However, the level of urbanization in the latter stood at 65% whereas
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developing market economies had an urbanization level half of that.

Furthermore, as

a recent survey puts it  [s]ince primate cities are invariably national capitals, they are
centers of decision-making and opinion-forming. They are thus able to dominate their
countries both economically and politically (Balchin et al. 2000, p. 64).
Policymakers and international agencies are concerned about the cost of overpopu-
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lation, congestion, crime, and unbalanced urban hierarchies in these megacities.

The

literature in urban and development economics points out that though a high degree
of urban concentration might be useful in early stages of development by conserving on
economic infrastructure and enhancing information spillovers at precisely the point when
infrastructure and information are at a premium, it results in a misallocation of resources
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at later stages of development.

This is because once a certain level of urban concentra-

tion is attained, economies of scale get exhausted and mega-cities transform into sites
that are excessively congested with high infrastructure costs. The consequences of this
misallocation are not only static but dynamic. For instance, Henderson (2003) provides
evidence that supports the notion that excessive urban concentration has signicant

1 For

these numbers, see Bairoch (1988).
for instance, UN (1993) and the World Development Report (2000).
3 See Williamson (1965) and Hansen (1990).
2 See,
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negative eects on productivity growth.
Given the importance of the consequences of excessive urban concentration, the natural question to explore is its causes. We now have an extensive literature that argues
that observed levels of urban concentration arise from the nature of political institutions and the policy choices that follow (Ades and Glaeser, 1995; Krugman and Livas,
1996; Henderson and Becker, 2000; Davis and Henderson, 2003). Here, one argument
is that national governments may favor certain cities over others.

The favorites may

be capital cities (Mexico City, Seoul, London or Paris) or the traditional seats of the
elites (Istanbul or Sao Paulo). Such favoritism may take the form of underinvestment
in provincial transport or telecommunications networks, restrictions in nancial markets
and transactions, preferential treatment of elites in favored cities in the allocation of
licenses, quotas, production and trading rights, as well as the disproportionate provision
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of local public services.

Another argument proered along these lines, and the one which we empirically test
in this paper, is that mega-cities may arise from the restrictive trade policies adopted.
The literature on the eects of trade policy on urban concentration consists of two
generations of models. The new generation of models diers in two respects from the
older generation. It relaxes the assumption of perfectly competitive markets favored by
the older generation and endogenizes regional scale economies that remain exogenous
in the older models.

Both generations contain models that either assume locations

within countries to be identical or introduce some sort of nonhomogeneity in inherent
characteristics across locations.
With identical locations across the national space, the eects of trade on urban
concentration work through dierent channels depending on the specications adopted
in a given model.

The early literature as exemplied by Henderson (1982) nds that

with perfect competition and external regional economies of scale, protection applied
to industries in large cities raises urban concentration by attracting resources to these
industries. In the New Economic Geography (NEG) literature where markets are taken
to be monopolistically competitive and economies of scale are endogenized, whether
trade liberalization leads to more or less urban concentration depends on the relative
strength of the agglomeration and dispersion forces introduced. In our context it is useful
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several political economy channels, excessive urban concentration may in turn have negative consequences on economic outcomes. Karayalcin and Ulubasoglu (2011) provide evidence that the
stiing of political competition in economies with high urban concentrations lead to low developmental
outcome measures.
2

to think of the agglomeration forces coming into play in the following manner. When
trade barriers are high, monopolistically competitive rms that produce for the domestic
market prefer to locate as close to a large number of consumers (backward linkages) found
in a metropolis. Firms would also prefer the metropolis as it would oer better access
to other rms that supply inputs for the production process and consumption goods for
their workers (forward linkages). Trade liberalization would then increase the share of
goods bought from and sold to abroad and thus reduce the strength of the backward and
forward linkages. To the extent that dierent cities have similar access to foreign markets
and goods, trade would then lead to a weakening of the logic of agglomeration and to
the dispersion of rms and consumers across urban centers. Other things being equal,
dispersion forces impose a limit on how far urban concentration would be able to go.
In Krugman and Livas (1996) these take the form of exogenous urban congestion costs
which are independent of the level of trade and are dominated by agglomeration forces.
Behrens et al. (2007) introduces two additional forces of dispersion. One arises from
the assumed immobility of some workers (farmers) across regions that would induce
rms and mobile industrial workers to spread out to be close to the farmers to avoid
the costly long-distance shipment of food or manufactured goods. This is the dispersion
force of the original Krugman (1991) model. A second one arises from the assumption
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that markups fall with the intensity of local competition.

Thus, rms would prefer to

spread out spatially to avoid reduced prots caused by lower markups in cities with high
rm concentrations. Papers, such as Monfort and Nicolini (2000) and Paluzie (2001),
that predict that trade liberalization, once it exceeds a certain threshold, would induce
higher levels of urban concentration rely on the intensity of the dispersion forces falling
faster than that of the agglomeration forces. Papers, such as Krugman and Livas (1996)
and Behrens et al.

(2007), that reach the opposite conclusion have built in to their

structure the reverse conguration of the two opposing forces.
With locations that dier in some dimension from others additional considerations
arise. Rauch (1991), working in the perfectly competitive setup introduces dierential
trade costs across cities. In autarkic equilibrium the location of cities would be inconsequential with the result that all cities would be of equal size. When trade costs are
at an intermediate level, cities with lower trade costs (border cities, port cities) would
be bigger than the internal cities. Further trade liberalization would lead to even larger
cities at the border and a higher level of urban concentration. Mansori (2003) obtains
a similar result within the NEG framework as the cost of access to foreign markets

5 This

is the assumption introduced in Ottaviano et al. (2002).
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provides another channel through which agglomeration forces reveal themselves. Bruelhart et al.

(2004) and Crozet and Konig (2004) build models that show that trade

liberalization may attract domestic rms to the border (or port cities) which have while
lower trade costs, these rms may also move to the interior regions where they face less
competition from foreign rms. Thus, once again whether trade liberalization increases

6

urban concentration becomes an empirical question.

The mechanisms discussed so far operate in static setups. Trade liberalization, however, has dynamic consequences mainly because it raises the rate of growth of GDP.
The seminal work of Williamson (1965) argued that we should expect there to be a
non-monotonic relationship between rising income levels and urban concentration. At
low levels of income urban concentration would be high as this would help conserve
expenditure on infrastructure and enhance information spillovers at a point when the
economy suers from a severe scarcity of infrastructure and information. With higher
incomes, it becomes possible to spread the infrastructure and information into the hinterland, while rising costs in congested urban areas push producers and consumers out
of these erstwhile centers. This pattern of income growth, resulting initially in higher
and later in lower urban concentration, is supported by a number of empirical studies
(El-Shaks 1972; Rosen and Resnick 1980; Wheaton and Shishido 1981; Mutlu 1989; Ades
and Glaeser 1995; Junius 1999; Davis and Henderson 2003; and Moomaw and Alwosabi
2004).
The question as to whether trade liberalization intensies the forces of urban agglomeration or dispersion, then, becomes an empirical one. The empirical literature on
the subject may be divided into two groups.

7

The rst group relies on cross-country

regressions, while the second one studies heterogeneous responses of dierent regions
within a country. One remarkably consistent nding that emerges from the rst group
is that trade openness has no statistically signicant eect on urban concentration. The
results obtained by the studies in the second group are mixed, with half of the fourteen
papers surveyed in Bruelhart (2011) nding support for the hypothesis that trade openness is associated with spatial divergence and three papers suggesting the opposite. A
more careful recent study in this group by Redding and Sturm (2008), which looks at
the eects of the loss of trading partners triggered by the division of Germany on urban

6 See

also Hanson (1998, 2001). There is now also a small literature (see Cosar and Fajgelbaum (2012)
and Allen and Arkolakis (2013)) that explores the link between trade and the spatial distribution of
population with forces that are distinct from the agglomeration ones in play in the new economic
geography literature.
7 Here we follow the recent survey of this literature by Bruelhart (2011).
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concentration, nds that trade reduces urban concentration.
To understand these results it is useful to start with the second group that relies
on within-country data using a single country as its focus (and, thus faces the standard
external-validity problem). Here the typical measure of spatial concentration is either
the level or the rate of growth of regional GDP per capita (and in some cases the regionindustry share of employment). As for the measure of trade openness, it needs to be
noted that half of the papers in this group use Mexican data and use the trade liberalization episode associated with NAFTA to identify the change in policy. The nding of
spatial divergence in the Mexican case is easily explained by the observation that liberalization shifted economic activity to regions bordering the USA. As these regions were
relatively more industrialized and richer than the rest of Mexico prior to liberalization,
it is not surprising to nd that trade exacerbated regional inequalities in general. The
instructive exception in this group is Sanguinetti and Martincus (2009) who nd that
those Argentinian manufacturing sectors that received the largest tari reductions in the
19851994 period tended to have their employment grow faster in regions that are not
usually associated with the traditional sites of manufacturing activity in and around the
main port and largest city, Buenos Aires. This result is also important because unlike
most of the non-Mexican papers in this group, Sanguinetti and Martincus use changes
in tari rates and do not depend on such endogenous measures of trade openness as
trade-to-GDP ratios. The same cannot be said for the vast majority of the papers in
the rst group. There, starting with Rosen and Resnick (1980) and Ades and Glaeser
(1995), the standard measure of trade openness is the trade-to-GDP ratio. As pointed
out in Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) using an outcome variable such as trade-to-GDP
(or imports-to-GDP) is inappropriate if we want to go beyond general correlations and
explore the causal eects of trade liberalization on urban concentration (spatial convergence). This is because both trade (or imports) and GDP are endogenous variables and
causal economic identication of the eect of changes in trade policy requires exogenous
instruments that are correlated with trade but not with urban concentration. This is
recognized in Ades and Glaeser (1995) where trade openness (as measured by trade-toGDP ratio) loses its signicance in IV regressions, thereby placing its causal eect on
urban concentration in question.
In this paper, we take the question of causality seriously and dier from the existing
literature by avoiding the use of endogenous outcome measures (like trade volume)
that do not correspond to any trade policy measure that is directly controlled by policymakers. We tackle these issues by adopting an improved methodology and data set to
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study the eects of trade liberalization on urban concentration (spatial convergence). We
look for tari measures that are controlled by policy-makers and implement tests using
continuous treatment measures. We try to answer the right policy question and attend
to problems of causality and identication while avoiding biases by using a dierencein-dierence approach.

To put it dierently, we are concerned with a treatment-and-

control partition of countries based on their engagement in trade liberalization, and
we test whether the liberalizers experienced a reduction in urban concentration.

8

Our

policy experiment approach relies on identication in the time dimension rather than
in cross section. Our trade openness data are the new and detailed Estevadeordal and
Taylor (2013) tari data on consumption, capital, and intermediate goods gathered from
primary sources (based on digital sources for recent years, but also on archival sources
for the 1980s that have not been used so far).

Based on an empirical identication

strategy where we rst use a continuous treatment measure (changes in various taris)
with a dierence-in-dierence design and then construct two instrumental variables to
address endogeneity concerns, we nd a signicant correlation between tari reductions
and declines in urban concentration following the Great Liberalization experiment of
the Uruguay Round. The results we obtain are robust to many alternative estimation
methodologies and consideration of alternative explanatory variables and can perhaps be
best visualized as in Figure 2. In that gure we trace the level of urban concentration (using the same measure as in Figure 1a) over the last 30 years for both the liberalizers and
the non-liberalizers. As the gure shows ex ante (before the Uruguay round), the level
of urban concentration of the treatment group (liberalizers) tracks that of the control
group (non-liberalizers) very closely, with there being barely any discernible dierence.
If our argument is valid we should see a signicant divergence after the treatment and
this is exactly what we observe in Figure 2. With the Uruguay round of liberalization
there starts a dramatic divergence in the levels of urban concentration of the two groups,
with the treatment group of liberalizers seeing a signicant decline in its level of urban
concentration relative to that of the control group of non-liberalizers.
In the next sections, we rst develop our estimation methodology and discuss the
data in detail, where we rely on statistical methods of the treatment-control type that
are designed to avoid the typical problems that arise in cross-section methods; we also
address endogeneity concerns using novel arguments, given the fact that standard instruments are not useful in this context. In the nal main section, we discuss our estimation

8 We

should emphasize that our focus here is squarely on urban concentration and not the more
general question of regional disparities.
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results. A concluding section ends the paper.

2

Estimation Methodology and Data

In this section, we present the estimation methodology and data, which take a dierent
route from the previous empirical literature on the subject. Here, we take the question of
the relation between trade openness and urban concentration as being a question of the
causal eects of a change in policy. In other words, we are interested in the consequences
of the policy of trade liberalization on urban concentration. To answer this question,
we have an empirical design in mind that considers post-1990 trade liberalization as
a treatment. Following Estevadeordal and Taylor (2013; ET hereafter), we implement
this design by employing two methods.

The rst of these methods takes openness as

a continuous treatment and uses tari rates as a proxy for openness in regressions in
dierences.

The advantage of using dierence estimators is well-known:

they avoid

the problems associated with omitted variables as long as the omitted regressors do
not change over time.

To the extent that these regressors are time-invariant country

characteristics, for example institutions that remain little changed over the medium
run, this method is helpful in addressing the bias associated with omitted variables.
The second method we use is an instrumental variables approach that enables us to
address potential endogeneity issues.

2.1

Openness as a continuous treatment

The literature so far has asked the question: do higher levels of trade increase or decrease
urban concentration, all else being equal? Given the impossibility of including all the
relevant controls, it is not surprising that the results obtained in the literature are fragile
and indeterminate, being marred by omitted variable bias. To this, one also needs to
add the fact that the vast majority of the papers use endogenous measures, such as
trade-to-GDP ratios, for trade openness that renders causal economic identication of
the eects of trade policies impossible.
Here, we follow an alternate strategy that takes post-1990 trade liberalization as a
treatment. The question we consider is: do the rates of growth of population of cities
in a given country accelerate relative to that of the largest city in liberalizing countries
(the treatment group) as compared to non-liberalizing ones (the control group)? This
way of posing the question not only leads to a cleaner empirical design but also naturally
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points to an estimation that involves dierences in growth rates of cities, which, in turn,
has the advantage of dealing with omitted-variable bias by eliminating country-specic
xed eects through dierencing.
Of course, for this empirical design to work, there needs to be a group of countries
that were subject to treatment. ET cogently argue that the Uruguay round 1986-1994
provided exactly this kind of treatment: prior to the Uruguay round there were very
few developing countries that underwent any serious trade liberalization, whereas the
1986-1994 round involved 125 countries (developed and developing) that chose to reduce
tari barriers substantially. Another group of countries (the control group) had either
low taris to begin with and left them low, or had high taris and kept them high or
imposed even higher ones.

9

Using the empirical design described, together with the data to be dened below,
we use the fact that changes in taris during the Uruguay round provide a continuous
treatment and run the following regression:





∆ ln pi,j = α∆ ln 1 + tj + β ln pi,j
1985 + c

(1)

where the dependent variable is the change in a city-specic urban concentration measure
calculated as the rate of growth of the population of the

ith most

populous city relative

to the rate of growth of population of the largest city in country

j

during the trade

liberalization period of 1985-2000 dened as:







i,j
1,j
1,j
∆ ln pi,j = ln pi,j
2000 − ln p1985 − ln p2000 − ln p1985



pim is the population of the ith largest (i.e., most populated) city in country j in
year m. In order to capture convergence eects, we include the log initial population of
i,j
th
the i largest city, ln p1985 , as an independent variable in the regression. We also include
a constant c to capture the scale eects.
where

We want to measure the eects of a change in openness measured by a tari change
dened as:











∆ ln 1 + tj = ln 1 + tj2000 − ln 1 + tj1985
where the tari measure

tj

for country

j



is the average of the taris for imports of capital

and intermediate inputs.
The regression equation suggests that if smaller cities (i.e., cities other than the
largest city) have grown faster than the largest city in their country (i.e., if

9 See

ET for a detailed discussion and list.
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∆ ln pi,j > 0

on average across i) due to a decrease in tari rates (i.e., if

∆ ln (1 + tj ) < 0),

we would

th
expect to have a negative and signicant α estimate. The log initial population of the i
i,j
largest city ln p1985 has been included in the regression to capture the convergence eects
among small cities, because a small city may grow faster than a bigger city (where a
bigger city is not necessarily the largest city); hence, the coecient in front of log initial
population

β

10

has an expected negative sign as well.

We employ two alternative estimation methods, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and
Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS). While OLS is our benchmark method, we employ
TSLS to consider possible endogeneity issues. These issues arise because it may be the
case that, for instance, tari policy and urban concentration might just be reections
of a deeper causal variable such as institutions.

In this view, economic and political

institutions would have a causal eect on urban concentration and trade (and other)
policies, which would then causally aect urban concentration further. Though it is hard
to deny the purchase of such arguments when one is concerned with levels (cross section),
given the slow rate of change in and persistence of institutions over time commonly found
in the recent empirical literature (see Acemoglu et al., 2001 and 2011), one would expect
that these concerns would not be valid in dierences (time series). In fact, ET show that
in the sample used here, there exists neither a clear, nor a robust relationship between
institutional changes and changes in trade policy.
However, given the fact that trade policy is a choice variable and therefore endogenous, there still remains the need for a source of exogenous variation in the trade policies
of 1980s and 1990s. Here we again follow ET in taking the view that the biggest exogenous shock to trade policy for the last century was the shifts in these policies in the 1930s
triggered by the Great Depression.

As a whole, the argument goes, the world moved

away from liberal economic policies in the interwar period. Thus not only were taris
much higher in 1945 than in 1913 in most countries, but quotas, which had hardly been
used prior to World War I, were in wide use by the end of World War II. The creation of
GATT in 1947 and much later WTO in 1995 introduced two international institutions
charged with the reinstatement of the world trading system. Most developing countries,
however, remained highly protectionist and only a small minority of these took part in
any serious sustained trade liberalization until the Uruguay round, maintaining until

10 One

important detail here is that the i'th largest city in the pre-liberalization period may turn out
not to be the i'th largest city in the post liberalization period. This does not present a problem for our
analysis as we are interested in the overall ranking of cities rather than the identities of particular cities
in the ranking.
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that point with taris the levels of which dated back to the policy shift of the 1930s.
To see how this history helps us in addressing the possible endogeneity of our treatment variables, note that, following ET, we would argue that an exogenous component
can be constructed in the following manner. We rst observe that the interwar shocks
led all countries towards more protectionist policies. The degree and the duration of protectionism each country adopted, however, depended on the size of the exogenous shock
they were subjected to by the Great Depression.

Thus, those countries that suered

less from the Great Depression had relatively lower taris and less persistent protection
later on. Furthermore, for a country to be able to see a big cut in taris later on, it
had to not only be willing to cut them, it also had to have high taris to cut in the rst
place. These considerations are taken into account in the construction of two alternative
j
j
country-specic instruments (I1 and I2 ) called GATT Potential, to be used as predictors of the ability and willingness of a country reduce taris under the Uruguay round.
The rst of these instruments is dened as:





I1j = ln 1 + tj1985 × [GATT

member in 1975]

This is an indicator variable that is the product of two measures that would likely promote trade liberalization. It is dened as the interaction of the country's ability (proxied
by pre-Uruguay level of taris) and willingness (proxied by 1975 GATT membership) to
cut taris in the Uruguay round. For a country to institute a signicant reduction in
taris it had to have high taris to begin with and had to enter the Uruguay round with
the willingness to actually cut the taris. One could perhaps question the validity of
this instrument by arguing that the decision to enter GATT by 1975 might be correlated
with the decision to reduce taris in the Uruguay round later. If this were the case the
exclusion restriction might not hold. We would then have to search for a deeper and
perhaps historically more distant determinant of the policy stance towards trade reform.
Based on the political economy literature, ET argue that this deep determinant can be
found in the variance of the intensity of the shock suered by dierent economies during
the Great Depression. Reading the historical record as providing evidence for the depth
of the Great Depression shock predicting the speed of trade liberalization roughly ve
decades later, we construct our second instrument as the interaction of the intensity of
Great Depression (as measured by the average deviation of 1930-35 GDP level from 1929
level) with again the pre-Uruguay tari level.






I2j = ln 1 + tj1985 × 

Average deviation of 1930-35
GDP level from 1929 level

10




The exclusion restriction for this instrument is expected to be valid a priori because of
two reasons: (1) the distance in time between the 1930s and the 1990s is long enough,
and (2) there is no direct link between urban concentration levels of the 1930s (which
were aected by several factors, such as terms of trade shocks, specic to that era) and
those of 1980s.
Given the logic behind our instruments, we run the following regressions as the rst
stage of TSLS:





∆ ln 1 + tj = γIkj + ϕ ln pi,j
1985 + c
where the log initial population
coecient

ln pi,j
1985

for

k = 1, 2

is the exogenous variable in the analysis. The

γ in front of the instruments representing the GATT Potential

has a negative

expected sign, because higher GATT Potential leads to higher tari reductions. The

R−squared

value of this rst-stage regression, together with the corresponding F-test,

can be used as an indicator for the strength of our instruments.
Our benchmark regression does not control for other confounding changes that could
be taking place within countries and could potentially aect urban concentration. Accordingly, in our rst robustness analysis, we consider additional explanatory variables
(namely country-specic economic growth, country-specic economic growth squared,
dummy variables capturing the largest city being the capital city and/or a port city,
country-specic log initial domestic transportation infrastructure, and country-specic
regime change) that we will further dene, below, and the regression equation is revised
as follows:













∆ ln pi,j = α∆ ln 1 + tj + µy ∆ ln y j + µy2 ∆ ln y j
where

yj

represents GDP per capita, and

µx

2

+ µx Xpi,j + β ln pi,j
1985 + c

(2)

is a vector of coecients capturing the

eects of exogenous explanatory variables (i.e., additional explanatory variables other
than growth and growth squared) denoted by the matrix of

Xpi,j .

We included economic

growth squared besides economic growth in order to capture any nonlinear relation

11

between the change in urban concentration and economic growth.

In particular, Hen-

derson (2000) shows that urban concentration increases with per capita income up to a
certain level, declining thereafter.
Within these additional explanatory variables, the only concern is the possible endogeneity of the country-specic economic growth. Therefore, in the TSLS estimation

11 It

is important to emphasize that we also considered only the rate of growth itself, however it was
econometrically insignicant. Such results are available upon request.
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of the robustness analysis, besides instrumenting the tari change according to the rst
stage regression of:





∆ ln 1 + tj = γIkj + ϕx Xpi,j + ϕp ln pi,j
1985 + c
we also instrument country-specic economic growth

for

k = 1, 2

∆ ln (y j ) according to the following

rst stage regression:





∆ ln y j = θy Xyi,j + θx Xpi,j + θp ln pi,j
1985 + c
where

θy

(3)

is a vector of coecients capturing the eects of standard explanatory variables

in growth regressions (i.e., instruments in this paper) denoted by the matrix of

Xpi,j

include log initial per capita income, log initial schooling, log initial institutions
i,j
i,j
log initial tari rate; Xp and ln p1985 enter the equation as exogenous variables.

12

that

, and

In our benchmark regressions, in order to have a healthy comparison across the
regression results, we use information from all cities in our sample where the number of
cities dier across countries and some countries are ignored due to the availability of the
data for instruments; for sure, we also consider a robustness analysis in which we use
all the available information in the data set. In an alternative robustness analysis, we
treat all countries symmetrically by using the same number of cities from each of them.
Since each country has a dierent number of cities in our sample, there is a tradeo
between the maximum number of countries and the maximum number of cities from
each country; accordingly, in this robustness analysis, we consider all possible number
of cities (up to 80) from each country. We also consider another robustness analysis in
which we weight the information coming from each city of a particular country by the
inverse of the number of cities from that country.
It is important to emphasize that, in our regressions, we also account for withingroup dependence in estimating standard errors of regression parameter estimates at
the country level. We achieve this by using (and providing the p-values for) the wild
cluster bootstrap-t method developed by Cameron et al. (2008) who show that the wild
cluster bootstrap-t method is superior to its alternatives, such as using the cluster-robust
standard errors, especially when the number of clusters is low with respect to the sample
size as in this paper.

12 These

are among the exogenous control variables that are robustly partially correlated with economic growth as suggested by Barro (1991) and Sala-i-Martin et al (2004).
12

2.2

Data

Since we would like to test whether the liberalizers have experienced a reduction in urban
concentration, we need measures of liberalization and urban concentration. We measure
liberalization by the change in taris between pre-liberalization and post liberalization
periods (i.e., by

∆ ln (1 + tj ),

above).

For urban concentration, earlier literature has

typically used the population in largest city (and its share of urban population). This
measure tends to ignore useful information about the dynamics of urban concentration
at lower levels of the distribution. Here, we consider an urban concentration measure at
the city level to capture the interactions among urban centers. Our (change in) urban
concentration measure employs the dierences in growth rates of a given number of cities
from that of the largest city (i.e.,

∆ ln pi,j ,

above).

For example, for the U.S., in our

benchmark case, we look at the dierences between the rates of growth of populations of
all other cities from that of New York City. This is similar to the measure recently used by
Redding and Sturm (2008) who study the eects of the loss of trading partners triggered
by the division of Germany on urban concentration by focusing on the dierences in the
rates of growth of population of border and internal cities.
We use the following data for our empirical analysis.

Taris:

13

14

The country-specic tari data are from ET, who have compiled data on

disaggregated Most Favored Nation (MFN) applied taris for two eras that we use as
benchmarks: a pre-liberalization period circa 1985 (in practice, between 1985 and 1993),
and a post liberalization period circa 2000 (in practice, between 1999 and 2004).

15

For

robustness, we consider three dierent tari measures for imports of capital, intermediate
inputs, and consumption. The corresponding tari rates, before and after liberalization,
are given in Figures 3-5.

City Populations:

The city-level population data refer to populations of agglom-

13 Redding

and Sturm (2008) nd that loss of trade leads to more urban concentration as this led to
a slower rate of growth of population for border cities. This nding is similar to ours in that we nd
that creation of trade leads to less urban concentration.
14 The list of countries is as follows: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium,
Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France,
Germany, Ghana, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay,
Venezuela.
15 ET show that tari rates in liberalizing countries have started to decline prior to the signing of the
agreement and that the decline has accelerated with it. See Figure 3 in ET.
13

erations/metropolitan areas that include a central city and neighboring towns (suburbs)
forming a connected region of dense, predominately urban population that is economically and culturally linked to the central city (e.g. by commuters).

16

The data have

been downloaded from http://www.populstat.info/, http://world-gazetteer.com/, and
http://www.citypopulation.de/ for the pre-liberalization period circa 1985 (in practice,
between 1980 and 1994) and the post liberalization period circa 2000 (in practice, be-

17

tween 1995 and 2004).

Instruments:

In order to create country-specic instruments for tari reductions

under the Uruguay round of GATT, we use (i) GATT membership data of Rose (2004)

18

,

and (ii) historical GDP data of Angus Maddison covering GDP of countries (in our
sample) between 1929 and 1935.

19

We use the following additional data in our robustness analysis.

GDP Per Capita:

The country-specic GDP per capita data have been obtained

from PWT (rgdpch) for the years of 1985 and 2000.

Schooling:

The country-specic measure of human capital has been proxied by the

total years of schooling obtained from Barro and Lee (2000).

We use the log initial

version of the data in the rst-stage growth regression.

Institutions:

The country-specic institutional quality is measured by the EFW

legal and property rights score (variable area 2). We use the log initial version of the
data in the rst-stage growth regression.

Capital City Dummy:

The capital city dummy takes a value of 1 when the largest

city in a country is also the capital city of the country as in Ades and Glaeser (1995)
and Storeygard (2012).

Port Dummy:

The port dummy takes a value of 1 when the largest city in a

country has a seaport. This dummy variable has been constructed by the authors by
checking the existence of a port in the largest city of each country in the sample. If this
is the case, the Rauch (1991) argument suggests that trade liberalization would shift
resources and population to the largest city as it benets from its increased access to

16 Given

the nature of an urban agglomeration, there is an unavoidable measure of arbitrariness in
the determination of its boundaries in any data set.
17 Country-specic details of the data set are given in the Appendix where we depict the exact dates
and sources of data for tari rates and city-level populations for each country in our sample for the
periods of pre liberalization and post liberalization. In the Appendix, we also included a table showing
the representativeness of our country sample.
18 GATT membership data of Rose (2004) has been obtained from faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/.
19 Historical
GDP
data
of
Angus
Maddison
has
been
obtained
from
http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/.
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foreign markets as a port city. Consequently, we would expect that urban concentration
as we measure it will rise with trade liberalization.

Initial Domestic Transportation Infrastructure:

We use the percentage of

roads paved (obtained from World Development Indicators) in 1985 to measure the
initial quality of the transportation infrastructure in each country in the sample. This
variable allows us to control for the ease with which resources can move across the cities
in a given country.

Higher transportation costs associated with poorer infrastructure

create incentives for the concentration of economic activity in a smaller number of cities.

Regime Change Dummy:

This is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 when

dictatorship ends in a country before 1985.

Following Ades and Glaeser (1995), we

accept a country as a dictatorship when its Gastil index is higher than 3. Therefore,
countries switch from a dictatorship to democracy when the Gastil index of a country
decreases from above 3 (in 1970-1974) to below 3 (in 1980-1984). We use the Gastil index
as documented in Barro and Lee (1994).

This variable is important for our purposes

because the literature (see Ades and Glaeser (1995), for instance) has documented a
signicant and robust positive relationship between levels of urban concentration and
dictatorships.

3

Estimation Results

The regression results for our benchmark case are given in Table 1 where the sample
is the same across dierent regressions.

Estimates of

α

are negative and signicant

using any estimation methodology for all types of taris (except for the tari change in
consumption goods when TSLS using the rst instrument is employed

20

). For instance,

when the tari change in capital goods is considered, the signicantly estimated
OLS is about

−0.71,

α

by

suggesting that when taris are reduced by 1%, on average, the

cities that are smaller than the biggest city grow 0.71% faster than the biggest city in the
same country over the fteen year period between 1985 and 2000. Since the average tari
change in capital goods is about 12%, on average, smaller cities have grown about 8.4%
faster than the biggest city in their countries between 1985 and 2000 (which comes to
0.56% per annum). Similar comparisons can be calculated for alternative tari rates and

20 Changes

in the taris for consumption goods would in general be expected to aect urban concentration dierently than changes in the taris for intermediate and capital goods. This is because
access to intermediates is more relevant for urban agglomerations where backward and forward linkages
between rms matter as in Krugman and Livas (1996).
15

estimation strategies. The estimates remain signicant when the wild cluster bootstrapt method (to account for within-group dependence at the country level) is considered for
which the p-values are depicted. Overall, these results suggest that trade liberalization
has led smaller cities to grow faster than the largest city across countries in our sample.
The coecient estimate

β

for the log of initial population is also negative and sig-

nicant, as expected in Table 1. The explanatory power of the regressions measured by
R-squared is low mostly because here we ignore other channels that might aect city
population growth. We obtain higher values in the following tables that report results of
our robustness analysis where we consider additional explanatory variables. For TSLS,
we can also test the strength of the instruments that we use to instrument the tari
change by looking at the details of the rst-stage regressions, which are given in Appendix Tables A2-A4.

In these tables, it is evident that the instruments signicantly

enter the regressions with their expected negative signs.

Moreover, for the rst-stage

regressions, the R-squared takes values up to 0.70, and the F-test results all have a
p-value of 0.00, which are both indicators of having strong instruments.
The regression results for our rst robustness analysis are given in Table 2, where
we have included per capita GDP growth, per capita GDP growth squared, capital
city dummy, port dummy, initial domestic transportation infrastructure, and a regime
change dummy in our regressions. As in the benchmark case, estimates of

α are negative

and signicant using any estimation methodology for all types of taris. Therefore, our
results are robust to the consideration of additional explanatory variables. Per capita
GDP growth enters the regressions signicantly with a negative sign, while per capita
GDP growth squared signicantly enters with a positive sign. Therefore, there is in fact
evidence of a nonlinear relation between the change in urban concentration and economic growth; i.e., in countries that have grown faster, the largest city has grown faster

21

than other smaller cities (i.e., urban concentration has increased).

It is important to

emphasize that the results for the rst-stage regressions to instrument both the tari
change and the economic growth are given in Appendix Tables A5-A6; as is evident, all
considered instruments enter the rst-stage regressions signicantly, and the R-squared
values are relatively high, showing the strength of our instruments.

Turning back to

Table 2, both the capital city dummy and the port dummy have negative and significant coecient estimates suggesting that when the largest city of a country is also a
port or the capital city, smaller cities have converged less to (or diverged from) that

21 It

is important to emphasize that we also considered only the economic growth itself, however it
was econometrically insignicant. Such results are available upon request.
16

largest city in terms of population. This result reects the fact that when the largest
city is also the capital city or a port city, increased trade shifts resources and population
to it and away from competing urban centers, increasing urban concentration. Initial
domestic transportation infrastructure has a positive and signicant eect suggesting
that when transportation costs are lower within a country, smaller cities tend to benet
from the incentive to disperse economic activity.

Finally, the regime change dummy

has mixed eects on urban concentration, depending on the estimation methodology,
and the coecient estimateβ for the log initial population is again negative and signicant as expected. The explanatory power of regressions has increased compared to the
benchmark case.

22

The regression results for our second robustness analysis are given in Figures 6-8
where we have treated countries symmetrically by considering equal numbers of cities
from each of them.

Since the number of cities diers across countries in our sample,

for additional robustness we consider all possible numbers of cities from each country;
therefore, each point at the horizontal axes of Figures 6-8 corresponds to a particular
regression that we have run.

The results show that estimates of

α

are almost always

negative and signicant using any estimation methodology for all types of taris (except
for the case using the tari change in consumption goods together with the rst instrument in Figure 8). Hence, our main result that trade liberalization leads to lower urban
concentration (in the sense that smaller cities growing faster than the largest city) across
countries is robust to many alternative estimation methodologies and consideration of
alternative explanatory variables. The explanatory power of the regressions as measured
by R-squared is also high and gets higher as we increase the (equal) number of cities
from each country (although the number of countries decreases in such a case).

4

23

Conclusion

In this paper, we explore the eects of trade liberalization on the change in urban
concentration. Theoretical literature on the subject identies two relevant and opposing
mechanisms.

The rst of these suggests that trade liberalization may diminish the

22 The

regression results based on the full sample, where the sample changes across regressions due
to some missing observations of instruments, are given in Appendix Tables A7-A8; as is evident, the
estimates of α are negative and signicant in almost all cases.
23 When we consider another robustness analysis in which we weight the information coming from
each city of a particular country by the inverse of the number of cities from that country, we obtain the
results in Appendix Tables A9-A10, where the estimates of α are negative and signicant in all cases.
17

eect of the agglomeration forces leading to the creation of megacities and thus lead to
reduced urban concentration. The second postulates that trade liberalization may lead
to the expansion of those megacities that have better access to world markets, thereby
increasing urban concentration. Empirical literature so far has been marred by the use
of endogenous measures of trade.

The innovation in this paper is the careful use of

exogenous tari policy changes and instruments. We show that, controlling for, among
others, largest cities that have ports and, thus, have better access to external markets,
trade liberalization has reduced urban concentration. We also improve upon the existing
more careful empirical studies that have focused on a single country, providing some
valuable external validity by working at the cross-country level of analysis. The results
are robust to the consideration of alternative empirical methodologies and sub-samples.
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Table 1 – Estimation Results with the Same Sample across Regressions - Benchmark Analysis

Estimation
Methodology

Tariff
Change in
Capital
Goods

Tariff
Change in
Intermediate
Inputs

Tariff
Change in
Consumption
Goods

-0.71* (0.00)
[-0.82,-0.61]
-0.97* (0.00)
[-1.07,-0.87]

OLS

-0.33* (0.00)
[-0.42,-0.23]

TSLS

-1.12* (0.01)
[-1.25,-0.98]
-1.27* (0.02)
[-1.41,-1.13]

using

-0.50* (0.00)
[-0.64,-0.36]

First Instrument

TSLS
using
Second Instrument

-1.08* (0.01)
[-1.32,-0.83]
-1.03* (0.01)
[-1.24,-0.81]
-1.26* (0.00)
[-1.46,-1.05]

Log Initial
Population

R-Squared

Sample
Size

-0.09* (0.00)
[-0.06,-0.05]

0.12

2878

-0.10* (0.00)
[-0.11,-0.10]

0.16

2878

-0.09* (0.00)
[-0.10,-0.08]

0.10

2878

-0.10* (0.00)
[-0.11,-0.10]

0.14

2878

-0.11* (0.00)
[-0.12,-0.10]

0.15

2878

-0.09* (0.00)
[-0.10,-0.08]

0.10

2878

-0.10* (0.00)
[-0.11,-0.09]

0.10

2878

-0.11* (0.00)
[-0.12,-0.10]

0.11

2878

-0.12* (0.00)
[-0.13,-0.11]

0.12

2878

Notes: All regressions include a constant. * represents significance at the 10% level. The p-values (for the null hypothesis of no effect) associated with the wild
cluster bootstrap-t method developed by Cameron et al. (2008) are given in parenthesis to the right of the corresponding estimates. The 90% confidence
intervals are given in brackets underneath the corresponding estimates.

Table 2 – Estimation Results with the Same Sample across Regressions - Alternative (Robustness) Analysis
Estimation
Methodology

Tariff
Change in
Capital
Goods

Tariff
Change in
Intermediate
Inputs

Tariff
Change in
Consumption
Goods

-1.46* (0.00)
[-1.58,-1.33]
-1.38* (0.00)
[-1.50,-1.25]

OLS

-1.14* (0.00)
[-1.26,-1.01]

TSLS

-1.70* (0.00)
[-1.87,-1.52]

using

-1.68* (0.00)
[-1.85,-1.51]

First
Instrument

TSLS
using
Second
Instrument

-0.72* (0.02)
[-0.91,-0.54]

-1.57* (0.00)
[-1.86,-1.29]
-1.20* (0.00)
[-1.44,-0.97]
-2.24* (0.00)
[-2.52,-1.94]

Per Capita
GDP Growth

Per Capita
GDP Growth
Squared

Capital
City
Dummy

Port Dummy

Initial
Domestic
Transportation
Infrastructure

Regime
Change

Log Initial
Population

R-Sqd

Sample
Size

-4.40* (0.00)
[-4.67,-4.13]

4.61* (0.00)
[4.34,4.88]

-0.35* (0.00)
[-0.37,-0.32]

0.02 (0.05)
[-0.00,0.04]

0.88* (0.00)
[0.83,0.94]

0.18* (0.00)
[0.14,0.23]

-0.09* (0.00)
[-0.10,-0.09]

0.41

2878

-3.63* (0.00)
[-3.92,-3.34]

3.72* (0.00)
[3.43,4.01]

-0.34* (0.00)
[-0.36,-0.31]

0.01 (0.15)
[-0.01,0.03]

0.80* (0.00)
[0.75,0.85]

0.18* (0.00)
[0.14,0.23]

-0.10* (0.00)
[-0.10,-0.09]

0.40

2878

-4.48* (0.00)
[-4.76,-4.20]

4.77* (0.00)
[4.49,5.05]

-0.37* (0.00)
[-0.39,-0.34]

0.04* (0.00)
[0.01,0.06]

0.92* (0.00)
[0.86,0.98]

0.18* (0.01)
[0.14,0.23]

-0.09* (0.00)
[-0.10,-0.09]

0.38

2878

-3.04* (0.00)
[-3.34,-2.74]

3.30* (0.00)
[2.95,3.65]

-0.26* (0.00)
[-0.28,-0.23]

-0.09* (0.00)
[-0.12,-0.07]

0.72* (0.00)
[0.66,0.79]

0.18* (0.00)
[0.14,0.23]

-0.09* (0.00)
[-0.10,-0.08]

0.28

2878

-3.04* (0.00)
[-3.33,-2.75]

3.33* (0.00)
[2.99,3.67]

-0.26* (0.00)
[-0.28,-0.23]

-0.05* (0.00)
[-0.07,-0.03]

0.75* (0.00)
[0.68,0.81]

0.20* (0.00)
[0.15,0.25]

-0.10* (0.00)
[-0.10,-0.09]

0.29

2878

-2.69* (0.00)
[-3.00,-2.38]

2.88* (0.00)
[2.51,3.25]

-0.28* (0.00)
[-0.31,-0.25]

-0.07* (0.00)
[-0.09,-0.04]

0.53* (0.00)
[0.45,0.61]

0.18* (0.00)
[0.14,0.23]

-0.08* (0.00)
[-0.09,-0.08]

0.22

2878

-2.36* (0.00)
[-2.68,-2.05]

2.75* (0.00)
[2.38,3.11]

-0.25* (0.00)
[-0.27,-0.22]

-0.10* (0.00)
[-0.13,-0.08]

0.62* (0.00)
[0.54,0.70]

0.17* (0.00)
[0.12,0.22]

-0.09* (0.00)
[-0.10,-0.09]

0.23

2878

-2.46* (0.00)
[-2.76,-2.15]

2.96* (0.00)
[2.60,3.32]

-0.24* (0.00)
[-0.27,-0.21]

-0.05* (0.00)
[-0.07,0.03]

0.56* (0.00)
[0.49,0.63]

0.19* (0.00)
[0.14,0.24]

-0.10* (0.00)
[-0.11,-0.09]

0.24

2878

-2.23* (0.00)
[-2.54,-1.91]

2.52* (0.00)
[2.15,2.88]

-0.31* (0.00)
[-0.34,-0.28]

-0.15* (0.00)
[-0.18,-0.13]

0.97* (0.00)
[0.87,1.08]

0.14* (0.00)
[0.09,0.19]

-0.10* (0.00)
[-0.11,-0.10]

0.25

2878

Notes: All regressions include a constant. * represents significance at the 10% level. The p-values (for the null hypothesis of no effect) associated with the wild
cluster bootstrap-t method developed by Cameron et al. (2008) are given in parenthesis to the right of the corresponding estimates. The 90% confidence
intervals are given in brackets underneath the corresponding estimates.

Figure 1a - Percentage of Urban Population in the Largest City

Figure 1b - Herfindahl Index of City Populations

Figure 2 - The Great Liberalization and the Percentage of Urban Concentration in the Largest City
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Notes: The average percentage of urban population in the largest city for nonliberalizers has been normalized to the corresponding average
value for liberalizers between 1970-1985 for comparison purposes. The samples are as follows:
Liberalizers: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, India, Japan, South Korea, Sri
Lanka, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Taiwan, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Nonliberalizers: Algeria, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cote d'Ivoire, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel,
Italy, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Paraguay, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

Figure 3 - Tariffs on Capital Goods - After versus Before
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Notes: The country codes in red represent liberalizers. See underneath Figure 2 for the exact list of countries.
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Figure 4 - Tariffs on Intermediate Inputs - After versus Before
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Notes: The country codes in red represent liberalizers. See underneath Figure 2 for the exact list of countries.

Figure 5 - Tariffs on Consumption Goods - After versus Before
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Figure 6 - Results with Equal Number of Cities from Each Country - Tariff Change in Capital Goods
Estimation by OLS

Estimation by TSLS - First Tariff Instrument

Estimation by TSLS - Second Tariff Instrument

R-Squared

Notes: The regressions, each corresponding to a particular point on the horizontal axes, include port dummy, domestic transportation infrastructure, regime
change, log initial population, and a constant. Upper and lower bounds correspond to the 90% confidence intervals.

Figure 7 - Results with Equal Number of Cities from Each Country - Tariff Change in Intermediate Inputs
Estimation by OLS

Estimation by TSLS - First Tariff Instrument

Estimation by TSLS - Second Tariff Instrument

R-Squared

Notes: The regressions, each corresponding to a particular point on the horizontal axes, include port dummy, domestic transportation infrastructure, regime
change, log initial population, and a constant. Upper and lower bounds correspond to the 90% confidence intervals.

Figure 8 - Results with Equal Number of Cities from Each Country - Tariff Change in Consumption Goods
Estimation by OLS

Estimation by TSLS - First Tariff Instrument

Estimation by TSLS - Second Tariff Instrument

R-Squared

Notes: The regressions, each corresponding to a particular point on the horizontal axes, include port dummy, domestic transportation infrastructure, regime
change, log initial population, and a constant. Upper and lower bounds correspond to the 90% confidence intervals.

APPENDIX (FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION)
Table A1a - Data Sources
Country
Code
ARG
AUS
AUT
BGD
BLX
BOL
BRA
CAN
CHL
CHN
CIV
COL
DEU
DNK
DZA
ECU
ESP
FIN
FRA
GBR
GHA
HKG
IDN
IND
ISL
ISR
ITA
JPN
KOR
LKA
MAR
MEX
MYS
NLD
NPL
NZL
PAK
PER
PHL
PRY
SWE
THA
TTO
TUR
TWN
URY
USA
VEN

Country Name
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Belgium-Luxembourg
Bolivia
Brazil
Canada
Chile
China
Cote d'lvoire
Colombia
Germany
Denmark
Algeria
Ecuador
Spain
Finland
France
United Kingdom
Ghana
Hong Kong
Indonesia
India
Iceland
Israel
Italy
Japan
South Korea
Sri Lanka
Morocco
Mexico
Malaysia
Netherlands
Nepal
New Zealand
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Paraguay
Sweden
Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
Turkey
Taiwan
Uruguay
United States
Venezuela

Preliberalization
MFN Tariff
NAT 1985
TRAINS 1992
TRAINS 1991
TRAINS 1989
TRAINS-EU 1988
NAT 1985
NAT 1985
TRAINS 1989
NAT 1985
NAT 1985
TRAINS 1993
NAT 1985
TRAINS-EU 1988
TRAINS-EU 1988
TRAINS 1992
NAT 1985
TRAINS-EU 1988
TRAINS 1988
TRAINS-EU 1988
TRAINS-EU 1989
TRAINS 1993
TRAINS 1988
TRAINS 1989
TRAINS 1990
TRAINS 1993
TRAINS 1993
TRAINS-EU 1988
NAT 1985
NAT 1985
TRAINS 1990
TRAINS 1993
NAT 1985
TRAINS 1988
TRAINS-EU 1988
TRAINS 1993
TRAINS 1992
NAT 1985
NAT 1985
NAT 1985
NAT 1985
TRAINS 1988
TRAINS 1989
TRAINS 1991
TRAINS 1993
NAT 1985
NAT 1985
TRAINS 1989
NAT 1985

Post Liberalization
MFN Tariff
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2001
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2001
TRAINS 1999
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 1998
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 1999
TRAINS 2001
TRAINS 2004
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 1999
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2001
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2001
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2001
TRAINS 1999
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000
TRAINS 2000

Preliberalization Population
Populstat.info 1985
Populstat.info 1991
Populstat.info 1991
Populstat.info 1991
Populstat.info 1988
Populstat.info 1992
Populstat.info 1980
Populstat.info 1991
Populstat.info 1985
Populstat.info 1985
Populstat.info 1988
Populstat.info 1985
Populstat.info 1987
Populstat.info 1988
Populstat.info 1987
Populstat.info 1990
Populstat.info 1988
Populstat.info 1985
Populstat.info 1990
Populstat.info 1985
Populstat.info 1984
Citypopulation.de 1991
Populstat.info 1990
World-gazetteer.com 1991
Populstat.info 1991
Populstat.info 1992
Populstat.info 1991
Populstat.info 1985
Populstat.info 1985
Populstat.info 1991
World-gazetteer.com 1994
Populstat.info 1990
Populstat.info 1991
Populstat.info 1988
Populstat.info 1991
Populstat.info 1991
Populstat.info 1981
Populstat.info 1981
Populstat.info 1980
Citypopulation.de 1982
Populstat.info 1989
Populstat.info 1980
Populstat.info 1990
Populstat.info 1980
Populstat.info 1985
Populstat.info 1985
Populstat.info 1990
Citypopulation.de 1981

Post Liberalization
Population
Populstat.info 1999
Populstat.info 2001
Populstat.info 2001
Populstat.info 2001
Populstat.info 1999
Populstat.info 2001
Populstat.info 2000
Populstat.info 2001
Populstat.info 2000
Populstat.info 2001
Populstat.info 1998
Populstat.info 2002
Populstat.info 2000
Populstat.info 2000
Populstat.info 1998
Populstat.info 2002
Populstat.info 2000
Populstat.info 2001
Populstat.info 1999
Populstat.info 1998
Populstat.info 2002
Citypopulation.de 2001
Populstat.info 2002
World-gazetteer.com 2001
Populstat.info 2001
Populstat.info 2002
Populstat.info 2001
Populstat.info 2000
Populstat.info 2000
Populstat.info 2001
World-gazetteer.com 2004
Populstat.info 2000
Populstat.info 2000
Populstat.info 1999
Populstat.info 2001
Populstat.info 2001
Populstat.info 1998
Populstat.info 1998
Populstat.info 1995
Citypopulation.de 2002
Populstat.info 2000
Populstat.info 2000
Populstat.info 2000
Populstat.info 1997
Populstat.info 2000
Populstat.info 2002
Populstat.info 2000
Citypopulation.de 2001

Notes: NAT stands for national sources, TRAINS stands for Trade Analysis and Information System, TRAINS-EU
stands for the EU schedule of tariffs according to TRAINS.

Table A1b – Representativeness of the Country Sample
GDP Per
Capita

GDP Per
Capita Growth

Export/GDP
(%)

Import/GDP
(%)

Urbanization

th

442.34

-0.12

8.08

9.55

10.09

th

1,313.77

1.55

13.32

14.84

17.43

th

3,999.16

2.36

21.21

22.79

25.19

th

19,866.90

3.09

30.31

33.19

39.06

th

22,713.54

4.58

46.27

47.83

55.33

th

333.05

-1.20

9.35

13.42

16.04

th

768.69

0.47

15.19

19.90

22.20

th

2,379.74

2.02

25.32

30.06

35.76

th

9,502.26

2.97

42.69

52.87

53.49

th

21,338.86

4.44

60.31

72.17

88.25

Country Sample in This Paper
10 Percentile
25 Percentile
50 Percentile
75 Percentile
90 Percentile

All Countries in WDI
10 Percentile
25 Percentile
50 Percentile
75 Percentile
90 Percentile

Notes: The percentiles compare the country sample in this paper with the complete set of countries in the WDI
data set on average over the period of 1970-1985. GDP per capita measures are in 2005US$. Urbanization
corresponds to the percentage of urban concentration in the largest city.

Table A2 – First-Stage Results of Benchmark TSLS Estimation Using The First Instrument
Dependent Variable
Instruments Used

Tariff Change in
Capital Goods

Tariff Change in
Intermediate Inputs

Tariff Change in
Consumption Goods

Initial Tariff ×
GATT Member in 1975

-0.56
[-0.57,-0.54]

-0.58
[-0.59,-0.57]

-0.61
[-0.62,-0.59]

Log Initial Population

-0.01
[-0.01,-0.01]

-0.01
[-0.01,-0.01]

-0.01
[-0.01,-0.01]

R-Squared

0.66

0.66

0.62

Sample Size

5522

5522

5522

Notes: All regressions include a constant. The 90% confidence intervals are given in brackets underneath the
corresponding estimates.

Table A3 – First-Stage Results of Benchmark TSLS Estimation Using The Second Instrument
Dependent Variable
Tariff Change in
Capital Goods

Tariff Change in
Intermediate Inputs

Tariff Change in
Consumption Goods

Initial Tariff ×
Average Deviation of
1930-35 GDP level from
1929 level

-3.76
[-3.99,-3.53]

-3.99
[-4.18,-3.80]

-2.64
[-2.83,-2.45]

Log Initial Population

-0.02
[-0.03,-0.02]

-0.03
[-0.03,-0.02]

-0.03
[-0.03,-0.03]

R-Squared

0.31

0.40

0.27

Sample Size

4400

4400

4400

Instruments Used

Notes: All regressions include a constant. The 90% confidence intervals are given in brackets underneath the
corresponding estimates.

Table A4 – First-Stage Results of Benchmark TSLS Estimation Using Both Instruments
Dependent Variable
Instruments Used

Tariff Change in
Capital Goods

Tariff Change in
Intermediate Inputs

Tariff Change in
Consumption Goods

Initial Tariff ×
GATT Member in 1975

-0.49
[-0.50,-0.48]

-0.40
[-0.42,-0.39]

-0.44
[-0.45,-0.42]

Initial Tariff ×
Average Deviation of
1930-35 GDP level from
1929 level

-2.83
[-2.99,-2.68]

-3.15
[-3.30,-3.00]

-1.89
[-2.03,-1.74]

Log Initial Population

-0.01
[-0.01,-0.01]

-0.01
[-0.01,-0.01]

-0.01
[-0.02,-0.01]

R-Squared

0.70

0.66

0.57

Sample Size

4400

4400

4400

Notes: All regressions include a constant. The 90% confidence intervals are given in brackets underneath the
corresponding estimates.

Table A5 – First-Stage Results of Alternative TSLS Estimation Using The First Instrument
Dependent Variable
Instruments and
Exogenous Variables

Tariff Change in
Capital Goods

Tariff Change in
Intermediate Inputs

Tariff Change in
Consumption Goods

Per Capita
GDP Growth

Initial Tariff ×
GATT Member in 1975

-0.48
[-0.49,-0.47]

-0.54
[-0.55,-0.53]

-0.50
[-0.51,-0.49]

Capital City Dummy

-0.04
[-0.05,-0.04]

-0.06
[-0.07,-0.06]

-0.05
[-0.06,-0.05]

0.01
[0.00,0.03]

Port Dummy

-0.02
[-0.03,-0.02]

-0.00
[-0.01,-0.00]

-0.01
[-0.01,0.00]

-0.08
[-0.09,-0.08]

Initial Domestic
Transportation
Infrastructure

0.13
[0.12,0.14]

0.15
[0.15,0.16]

0.23
[0.22,0.24]

0.42
[0.40,0.44]

Regime Change

-0.03
[-0.04,-0.03]

-0.06
[-0.07,-0.06]

-0.11
[-0.12,-0.10]

-0.02
[-0.03,-0.01]

Log Initial Population

-0.00
[-0.00,0.00]

-0.00
[-0.00,0.00]

0.00
[-0.00,0.00]

0.02
[0.01,0.02]

Log Initial GDP Per
Capita

-0.32
[-0.33,-0.31]

Log Initial Schooling

0.49
[0.47,0.51]

Log Initial Institutions

0.39
[0.37,0.41]

Initial Tariff

0.20
[0.16,0.23]

R-Squared

0.81

0.83

0.82

0.70

Sample Size

3691

3691

3691

3691

Notes: All regressions include a constant. The 90% confidence intervals are given in brackets underneath the
corresponding estimates.

Table A6 – First-Stage Results of Alternative TSLS Estimation Using The Second Instrument
Dependent Variable
Instruments and
Exogenous Variables

Tariff Change in
Capital Goods

Tariff Change in
Intermediate Inputs

Tariff Change in
Consumption Goods

Per Capita
GDP Growth

Initial Tariff ×
Average Deviation of
1930-35 GDP level
from 1929 level

-3.36
[-3.57,-3.14]

-3.50
[-3.68,-3.32]

-2.20
[-2.35,-2.05]

Capital City Dummy

0.01
[0.00,0.01]

-0.00
[-0.01,0.00]

-0.01
[-0.02,-0.01]

-0.01
[-0.02,0.00]

Port Dummy

-0.03
[-0.04,-0.03]

-0.01
[-0.02,-0.01]

-0.03
[-0.04,-0.03]

-0.11
[-0.12,-0.10]

Initial Domestic
Transportation
Infrastructure

0.23
[0.22,0.24]

0.24
[0.23,0.25]

0.31
[0.30,0.32]

0.47
[0.45,0.49]

Regime Change

-0.05
[-0.06,-0.04]

-0.05
[-0.06,-0.04]

-0.05
[-0.06,-0.04]

0.03
[0.02,0.05]

Log Initial Population

-0.00
[-0.01,-0.00]

-0.01
[-0.01,-0.01]

-0.01
[-0.01,-0.01]

0.02
[0.02,0.02]

Log Initial GDP Per
Capita

-0.35
[-0.36,-0.35]

Log Initial Schooling

0.57
[0.56,0.59]

Log Initial Institutions

0.25
[0.22,0.28]

Initial Tariff

0.00
[-0.03,0.04]

R-Squared

0.67

0.70

0.75

0.78

Sample Size

2878

2878

2878

2878

Notes: All regressions include a constant. The 90% confidence intervals are given in brackets underneath the
corresponding estimates.

Table A7 – Estimation Results with All Cities - Benchmark Analysis

Estimation
Methodology

Tariff Change in
Capital
Goods

Tariff Change in
Intermediate Inputs

Tariff Change in
Consumption Goods

-0.42* (0.00)
[-0.49,-0.35]
-0.35* (0.00)
[-0.41,-0.30]

OLS

-0.20* (0.00)
[-0.24,-0.16]

TSLS

-0.18* (0.01)
[-0.27,-0.08]
-0.09* (0.02)
[-0.16,-0.02]

using

0.15* (0.00)
[0.09,0.20]

First Instrument

TSLS
using
Second Instrument

-0.60* (0.01)
[-0.80,-0.41]
-0.62* (0.01)
[-0.78,-0.47]
-0.75* (0.00)
[-0.93,-0.57]

Log Initial
Population

R-Squared

Sample
Size

-0.05* (0.00)
[-0.06,-0.05]

0.05

5522

-0.05* (0.00)
[-0.06,-0.05]

0.05

5522

-0.05* (0.00)
[-0.05,-0.04]

0.04

5522

-0.05* (0.00)
[-0.05,-0.04]

0.03

5522

-0.04* (0.00)
[-0.05,-0.04]

0.03

5522

-0.04* (0.00)
[-0.04,-0.03]

0.03

5522

-0.06* (0.00)
[-0.07,-0.06]

0.05

4400

-0.07* (0.00)
[-0.07,-0.06]

0.06

4400

-0.07* (0.00)
[-0.08,-0.06]

0.06

4400

Notes: All regressions include a constant. * represents significance at the 10% level. The p-values (for the null hypothesis of no effect) associated with the wild
cluster bootstrap-t method developed by Cameron et al. (2008) are given in parenthesis to the right of the corresponding estimates. The 90% confidence
intervals are given in brackets underneath the corresponding estimates.

Table A8 – Estimation Results with All Cities - Alternative (Robustness) Analysis
Estimation
Methodology

Tariff
Change in
Capital
Goods

Tariff
Change in
Intermediate
Inputs

Tariff
Change in
Consumption
Goods

-1.32* (0.00)
[-1.42,-1.22]
-0.71* (0.00)
[-0.79,-0.64]

OLS

-0.33* (0.00)
[-0.39,-0.26]

TSLS

-0.91* (0.00)
[-1.04,-0.77]

using

-0.48* (0.00)
[-0.58,-0.39]

First
Instrument

TSLS
using
Second
Instrument

-0.10* (0.02)
[-0.18,-0.02]

-1.57* (0.00)
[-1.86,-1.29]
-1.20* (0.00)
[-1.44,-0.97]
-2.24* (0.00)
[-2.52,-1.94]

Per Capita
GDP Growth

Per Capita
GDP Growth
Squared

Capital
City
Dummy

Port Dummy

Initial
Domestic
Transportation
Infrastructure

Regime
Change

Log Initial
Population

R-Sqd

Sample
Size

-1.05* (0.00)
[-1.17,-0.93]

1.49* (0.00)
[1.35,1.63]

-0.19* (0.00)
[-0.21,-0.17]

-0.09* (0.00)
[-0.11,-0.07]

0.51* (0.00)
[0.47,0.55]

-0.04* (0.00)
[-0.06,-0.01]

-0.08* (0.00)
[-0.09,-0.08]

0.27

3691

-0.81* (0.00)
[-0.93,-0.69]

1.20* (0.00)
[1.06,1.34]

-0.20* (0.00)
[-0.22,-0.18]

-0.06* (0.00)
[-0.08,-0.04]

0.41* (0.00)
[0.37,0.45]

-0.05* (0.00)
[-0.07,-0.02]

-0.08* (0.00)
[-0.09,-0.07]

0.23

3691

-0.76* (0.00)
[-0.88,-0.64]

1.25* (0.00)
[1.10,1.40]

-0.20* (0.00)
[-0.22,-0.17]

-0.05* (0.00)
[-0.07,-0.03]

0.33* (0.00)
[0.29,0.37]

-0.04* (0.01)
[-0.06,-0.01]

-0.07* (0.00)
[-0.08,-0.07]

0.20

3691

-1.20* (0.00)
[-1.39,-1.01]

1.87* (0.00)
[1.61,2.13]

-0.17* (0.00)
[-0.19,-0.14]

-0.10* (0.00)
[-0.12,-0.08]

0.42* (0.00)
[0.38,0.47]

0.00 (0.45)
[-0.02,0.03]

-0.07* (0.00)
[-0.08,-0.07]

0.19

3691

-1.12* (0.00)
[-1.30,-0.95]

1.90* (0.00)
[1.66,2.15]

-0.17* (0.00)
[-0.19,-0.14]

-0.07* (0.00)
[-0.09,-0.05]

0.35* (0.00)
[0.31,0.40]

0.00 (0.43)
[-0.02,0.03]

-0.07* (0.00)
[-0.08,-0.06]

0.19

3691

-0.94* (0.00)
[-1.14,-0.75]

1.47* (0.00)
[1.20,1.75]

-0.18* (0.00)
[-0.20,-0.16]

-0.06* (0.00)
[-0.08,-0.04]

0.27* (0.00)
[0.22,0.32]

0.01 (0.19)
[-0.01,0.04]

-0.06* (0.00)
[-0.07,-0.05]

0.15

3691

-2.36* (0.00)
[-2.68,-2.05]

2.75* (0.00)
[2.38,3.11]

-0.25* (0.00)
[-0.27,-0.22]

-0.10* (0.00)
[-0.13,-0.08]

0.62* (0.00)
[0.54,0.70]

0.17* (0.00)
[0.12,0.22]

-0.09* (0.00)
[-0.10,-0.09]

0.23

2878

-2.46* (0.00)
[-2.76,-2.15]

2.96* (0.00)
[2.60,3.32]

-0.24* (0.00)
[-0.27,-0.21]

-0.05* (0.00)
[-0.07,0.03]

0.56* (0.00)
[0.49,0.63]

0.19* (0.00)
[0.14,0.24]

-0.10* (0.00)
[-0.11,-0.09]

0.24

2878

-2.23* (0.00)
[-2.54,-1.91]

2.52* (0.00)
[2.15,2.88]

-0.31* (0.00)
[-0.34,-0.28]

-0.15* (0.00)
[-0.18,-0.13]

0.97* (0.00)
[0.87,1.08]

0.14* (0.00)
[0.09,0.19]

-0.10* (0.00)
[-0.11,-0.10]

0.25

2878

Notes: All regressions include a constant. * represents significance at the 10% level. The p-values (for the null hypothesis of no effect) associated with the wild
cluster bootstrap-t method developed by Cameron et al. (2008) are given in parenthesis to the right of the corresponding estimates. The 90% confidence
intervals are given in brackets underneath the corresponding estimates.

Table A9 – Weighted Least Squares Estimation Results with the Same Sample across Regressions - Benchmark Analysis

Estimation
Methodology

Tariff
Change in
Capital
Goods

Tariff
Change in
Intermediate
Inputs

Tariff
Change in
Consumption
Goods

-1.03* (0.00)
[-1.16,-0.90]
-1.34* (0.01)
[-1.45,-1.24]

OLS

-0.56* (0.00)
[-0.66,-0.46]

TSLS

-1.34* (0.01)
[-1. 50,-1.19]
-1.71* (0.02)
[-1.86,-1.55]

using

-0.74* (0.00)
[-0.90,-0.59]

First Instrument

TSLS
using
Second Instrument

-1.73* (0.01)
[-1.94,-1.53]
-1.42* (0.01)
[-1.60,-1.24]
-1.83* (0.00)
[-2.03,-1.62]

Log Initial
Population

R-Squared

Sample
Size

-0.20* (0.00)
[-0.21,-0.19]

0.23

2878

-0.21* (0.00)
[-0.22,-0.20]

0.27

2878

-0.19* (0.00)
[-0.21,-0.18]

0.18

2878

-0.21* (0.00)
[-0.22,-0.20]

0.24

2878

-0.23* (0.00)
[-0.25,-0.22]

0.25

2878

-0.21* (0.00)
[-0.22,-0.20]

0.18

2878

-0.26* (0.00)
[-0.28,-0.25]

0.20

2878

-0.25* (0.00)
[-0.27,-0.24]

0.19

2878

-0.28* (0.00)
[-0.29,-0.26]

0.22

2878

Notes: Estimations are by weighted least squares where weights have been determined by "1/no. of cities from each country." All regressions include rank
fixed effects and a constant. * represents significance at the 10% level. The p-values (for the null hypothesis of no effect) associated with the wild cluster
bootstrap-t method developed by Cameron et al. (2008) are given in parenthesis to the right of the corresponding estimates. The 90% confidence intervals are
given in brackets underneath the corresponding estimates.

Table A10 – Weighted Least Squares Estimation Results with the Same Sample across Regressions - Alternative (Robustness) Analysis
Estimation
Methodology

Tariff
Change in
Capital
Goods

Tariff
Change in
Intermediate
Inputs

Tariff
Change in
Consumption
Goods

-1.61* (0.00)
[-1.80,-1.42]
-1.97* (0.00)
[-2.15,-1.79]

OLS

-1.18* (0.00)
[-1.36,-1.01]

TSLS

-2.22* (0.00)
[-2.41,-2.03]

using

-2.26* (0.00)
[-2.44,-2.07]

First
Instrument

TSLS
using
Second
Instrument

-1.22* (0.02)
[-1.44,-1.00]

-1.44* (0.00)
[-1.72,-1.16]
-0.86* (0.00)
[-1.09,-0.63]
-2.09* (0.00)
[-2.39,-1.78]

Per Capita
GDP Growth

Per Capita
GDP Growth
Squared

Capital
City
Dummy

Port Dummy

Initial
Domestic
Transportation
Infrastructure

Regime
Change

Log Initial
Population

R-Sqd

Sample
Size

-2.05* (0.00)
[-2.32,-1.79]

2.15* (0.00)
[1.89,2.42]

-0.32* (0.00)
[-0.35,-0.29]

-0.20* (0.00)
[-0.24,0.16]

0.67* (0.00)
[0.61,0.72]

-0.07* (0.00)
[-0.11,-0.02]

-0.17* (0.00)
[-0.18,-0.16]

0.38

2878

-0.52* (0.00)
[-0.85,-0.20]

0.47* (0.00)
[0.13,0.81]

-0.34* (0.00)
[-0.37,-0.31]

-0.25* (0.00)
[-0.28,-0.21]

0.61* (0.00)
[0.56,0.66]

-0.07* (0.00)
[-0.11,-0.03]

-0.20* (0.00)
[-0.21,-0.18]

0.37

2878

-2.05* (0.00)
[-2.33,-1.76]

2.31* (0.00)
[2.03,2.59]

-0.33* (0.00)
[-0.36,-0.30]

-0.17* (0.00)
[0.21,0.13]

0.67* (0.00)
[0.61,0.73]

-0.03 (0.15)
[-0.07,0.02]

-0.18* (0.00)
[-0.20,-0.16]

0.34

2878

-1.79* (0.00)
[-1.98,-1.60]

1.66* (0.00)
[1.40,1.91]

-0.34* (0.00)
[-0.37,-0.31]

-0.37* (0.00)
[-0.40,-0.33]

0.97* (0.00)
[0.90,1.04]

-0.11* (0.00)
[-0.16,-0.07]

-0.18* (0.00)
[-0.19,-0.17]

0.27

2878

-1.77* (0.00)
[-1.95,-1.58]

1.57* (0.00)
[1.32,1.83]

-0.36* (0.00)
[-0.39,-0.32]

-0.30* (0.00)
[-0.34,-0.27]

1.00* (0.00)
[0.93,1.07]

-0.08* (0.00)
[-0.13,-0.04]

-0.20* (0.00)
[-0.21,-0.19]

0.27

2878

-1.68* (0.00)
[-1.89,-1.46]

1.65* (0.00)
[1.36,1.94]

-0.31* (0.00)
[-0.34,-0.27]

-0.34* (0.00)
[-0.38,-0.30]

0.76* (0.00)
[0.67,0.86]

-0.05* (0.00)
[-0.10,-0.01]

-0.17* (0.00)
[-0.19,-0.16]

0.21

2878

-1.62* (0.00)
[-1.85,-1.40]

1.96* (0.00)
[1.67,2.24]

-0.17* (0.00)
[-0.21,-0.14]

-0.30* (0.00)
[-0.33,-0.26]

0.47* (0.00)
[0.41,0.53]

0.10* (0.00)
[0.06,0.14]

-0.19* (0.00)
[-0.20,-0.18]

0.22

2878

-1.85* (0.00)
[-2.07,-1.63]

2.30* (0.00)
[2.01,2.58]

-0.18* (0.00)
[-0.22,-0.15]

-0.24* (0.00)
[-0.28,-0.21]

0.38* (0.00)
[0.32,0.43]

0.13* (0.00)
[0.09,0.17]

-0.19* (0.00)
[-0.20,-0.17]

0.22

2878

-1.49* (0.00)
[-1.71,-1.28]

1.67* (0.00)
[1.39,1.95]

-0.21* (0.00)
[-0.25,-0.18]

-0.34* (0.00)
[-0.37,-0.30]

0.80* (0.00)
[0.71,0.89]

0.07* (0.00)
[0.03,0.11]

-0.20* (0.00)
[-0.21,-0.19]

0.24

2878

Notes: Estimations are by weighted least squares where weights have been determined by "1/no. of cities from each country." All regressions include rank
fixed effects and a constant. * represents significance at the 10% level. The p-values (for the null hypothesis of no effect) associated with the wild cluster
bootstrap-t method developed by Cameron et al. (2008) are given in parenthesis to the right of the corresponding estimates. The 90% confidence intervals are
given in brackets underneath the corresponding estimates.

